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McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Service:
Another Extension of the Over-Extended
Administrative Search Exception
In McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Service,1 the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit extended the administrative search
exception to the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches. The
suit alleged a novel violation of the ban in the form of a warrantless
involuntary commitment procedure. However, the court found that the
procedure fit neatly within the exception and declined to extend Fourth
Amendment protection to involuntary commitments.2
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mrs. Zinger, a Lynn, Massachusetts resident with a long history of
mental illness and high blood pressure, threatened her ex-husband and
disturbed the other tenants in her building.' On September 6, 1989, a
licensed psychiatrist signed an application for a ten-day involuntary
commitment pursuant to Massachusetts law,4 based on reports from her

1. 77 F.3d 540 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 275 (1996).
2. Id. at 546.
3. Id. at 542.
4. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123 § 12 (1996). "Entitled Emergency restraint of
dangerous persons; application for hospitalization; examination," this statute provides in
part:
(a) Any physician who is licensed pursuant to section two of chapter one hundred
and twelve or qualified psychiatric nurse mental health clinical specialist
authorized to practice as such under regulations promulgated pursuant to the
provisions of section eighty B of said chapter one hundred and twelve or a
qualified psychologist licensed pursuant to sections one hundred and eighteen to
one hundred and twenty-nine, inclusive of said chapter one hundred and twelve,
who after examining a person has reason to believe that failure to hospitalize such
person would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness may
restrain or authorize the restraint of such person and apply for the hospitalization
of such person for a ten day period at a public facility or at a private facility
authorized for such purposes by the department. If an examination is not possible
because of the emergency nature of the case and because of the refusal of the
person to consent to such examination, the physician, qualified psychologist or
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family and neighbors. 5 At the same time, Zinger's family attempted to
have her evicted from her apartment." On the morning of September
7, the constable charged with the eviction learned of the commitment
order and arranged to meet at the apartment with the local police
officers who were to carry out the order that afternoon.7 Accompanied
by an ambulance crew, the constable and the police officers first knocked
on Mrs. Zinger's door, then kicked it in when there was no response.'
Mrs. Zinger, alarmed at the presence of the police, tried to close the
door, but they detained her. She suffered a fatal heart attack after she
was handcuffed, forcibly carried to the ambulance, and strapped face
down on a stretcher.9
Mrs. Zinger's administratrix, McCabe, filed a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the City of Lynn, alleging that the City's policy authorizing police officers to use forcible, warrantless entries into residences to
execute commitment orders in the absence of exigent circumstances
deprived Mrs. Zinger of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches.'0 Following a hearing, the court granted
McCabe's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability

qualified psychiatric nurse mental health clinical specialist on the basis of the
facts and circumstances may determine that hospitalization is necessary and may
apply therefore. In an emergency situation, if a physician, qualified psychologist

or qualified psychiatric nurse mental health clinical specialist is not available, a
police officer, who believes that failure to hospitalize a person would create a

likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness may restrain such person
and apply for the hospitalization of such person for a ten day period at a public
facility or a private facility authorized for such purpose by the department. An
application for hospitalization shall state the reasons for the restraint of such
person and any other relevant information which may assist the admitting
physician or physicians. Whenever practicable, prior to transporting such person,

the applicant shall telephone or otherwise communicate with a facility to describe
the circumstances and known clinical history and to determine whether the
facility is the proper facility to receive such person and also to give notice of any
restraint to be used and to determine whether such restraint is necessary.
Id.
5. 77 F.3d at 542.
6. Id. Mrs. Zinger's children and ex-husband owned the apartment building. Id. at

542 n.1.
7. Id. at 542.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 543. The original complaint named the dispatching police officer, the
psychiatrist, the three police officers who helped carry out the order, the constable, the
ambulance crew, and the psychiatrist's hospital as additional defendants. McCabe also
alleged common law assault and battery, and negligence. She settled the claims against
the doctor and the hospital, and the claims against the officers, constable, and ambulance
crew were dismissed after the jury verdict. Id. at 543 n.3.
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against the City." In the subsequent trial, the jury awarded $850,000
in damages against the City and $500,000 against the ambulance
service.' 2 The City appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reversed, holding the search reasonable under the administrative
search exception.' 3
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Over the last forty years, the United States Supreme Court has
developed the administrative search exception to the general requirement of a warrant to avoid violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
exception balances the particular needs of the searching entity, usually
the government, with the privacy rights of the individual being searched.
The exception was first enunciated in Frank v. Maryland,4 when the
Court held that an ordinance could give the administrative arms of
government the right to a limited inspection of property without a
warrant when required by special needs, such as health and safety.15
Tracing the history of the Fourth Amendment to a reaction against
warrantless searches for criminal evidence and citing the long tradition
of city health and safety inspections, the Court determined that the
public good accomplished by inspections outweighed any minimal privacy
invasion."' The Court said that the balancing17of public and private
interests was appropriate in these special areas.
Less than ten years later, in 1967, the Supreme Court overruled the
Frank decision in Camara v. Municipal Court's and See v. City of

11. 77 F.3d at 543, rev'g, McCabe v. City of Lynn, 875 F. Supp. 53, 63 (D. Mass. 1995).
12. 77 F.3d at 543.
13. Id.
14. 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruling Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). A property owner refused to allow a city
inspector in his home after the inspector noticed signs of rodent infestation and requested
admission. The inspector had the homeowner fined pursuant to a city ordinance that
allowed inspections of homes during the daytime when there was reason to suspect a
nuisance inside. This ordinance was upheld by the Supreme Court. Id. at 361-62.

15. Id. at 373.
16. Id. at 368-72. Important in the determination was the ordinance's restriction of the
search to daytime, the need for the inspector to suspect a problem, and the fact that

findings of a problem would not result in criminal liability for the home owner. Id. at 36667.
17. Id. at 371-72.
18. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). A lessee of a ground floor apartment refused to allow an
inspection for violations of the city housing code. The lessee was arrested and filed for a
writ of prohibition. Id. at 525.
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Seattle."9 Finding that Frank wrongly restricted Fourth Amendment
protections solely to people suspected of criminal activity, the Court in
Camara determined that even in the health and safety realms, the
relaxation of the warrant requirement for inspections was too broad.2'
Instead, a warrant for an administrative search should be sought if a
citizen refused an inspector entry, unless there had been a citizen
complaint or there was another "satisfactory reason for securing
immediate entry."2 1 The Court balanced the long tradition of health
and safety inspections, the public benefit, and the search's limited
intrusion against the privacy interests to find the necessary reasonableness.22 Probable cause for a warrant would "exist if reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection
are satisfied with respect to [the] particular dwelling."" In See, the
Court held that for searches of businesses, an inspector, in the absence
of consent, would also need a warrant.2 4 However, licensing
programs
2
that require preliminary inspections were not included. 1
Three years later, the Supreme Court applied the administrative
search exception to statutorily mandated visits by welfare officials to
recipients' homes in Wyman v. James.6 The Court characterized such
visits not as searches that would fall under the Fourth Amendment, but
rather as interviews.2 '
Assuming that the visits had indeed been
searches, the Court held they were reasonable based on the public
interest in caring for the recipients' children, the protection of the public
trust of taxpayers' money, the proper interest a charitable agency has in
its clients, the emphasis of the controlling statute on a close relationship
with the recipient, and the statute's detailed rules limiting visits to
daytime and only after advance notice.28 Furthermore, the fact that
the visits were not made by the police demonstrated that they were
carried out for welfare and not for prosecution.29 The Court discounted
the need for a warrant in such situations: in order to obtain a warrant,
19. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). A warehouse owner refused to submit to a fire inspection.
The owner was arrested and fined, Id. at 541.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Camara, 387 U.S. at 530-34.
Id. at 539-40.
Id. at 537-39.
Id. at 538.
See 387 U.S. at 545.
Id. at 546.
400 U.S. 309 (1971). James received state aid for her dependent child and refused

to allow a visit, claiming it was a warrantless search. Denial of the visit meant cessation
of her aid, and Mrs. James sought injunctive relief. Id. at 313-14.
27. Id. at 317-18.
28. Id. at 318-24.
29. Id. at 322-23.
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the welfare official would need to establish a more compelling need than
seeing the child in the home, which would defeat the purpose of the
visit.'0 Finally, the Court distinguished Frank, Camara, and See
because those defendants were faced with potential criminal charges,
whereas Mrs. James faced only the cessation of benefits, which while
valuable, were not constitutionally guaranteed rights.3"
In the five years following Camara and See, the Supreme Court
developed another facet of the administrative search exception: the
"closely regulated business" exception. In this version of the exception,
the legislature grants search power through a statute to a governmental
regulatory agency. In Colonnade CateringCorp. v. United States3 2 and
United States v. Biswell,3 the Court acknowledged that certain
industries (in these cases, liquor and firearms) had long histories of
governmental regulation that permit Congress to authorize warrantless
inspections through specific statutes.3' The Court distinguished See,
in which the inspectors were trying to discover things that could not be
concealed in a short amount of time, from Biswell and Colonnade, in
which, if the inspections were to be effective, they had to be unannounced." In balancing the public interest of apprehending lawbreakers against the privacy rights of the business, the Court reasoned that
the dealers had chosen and benefitted from their regulated businesses
and knew that tight regulation would prevail.3" Thus, the dealers gave
implied consent to searches by merely entering into such businesses.3 7
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.," decided several years later, the Court
declined to extend the closely regulated business exception to all
businesses subject to Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA")

30. Id. at 324.
31. Id. at 325-26.

32. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). A catering company refused inspectors access to its liquor
supply, and the inspectors forced their way into the storeroom. Id. at 73. The Court held
that the liquor industry was heavily regulated; therefore, the federal statute allowed the

inspectors' warrantless searches. Id. at 76-77. However, the statute did not allow forced
entry. Id. at 77.
33. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Inspectors showed a gun dealer a copy of the statute that

permitted warrantless searches, and the dealer allowed access to his storeroom where guns
he was not licensed to carry were found. Id. at 312.
34. Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 76.
35. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
36. Id.
37. Geoffrey G. Hemphill, The AdministrativeSearch Doctrine: Isn't this Exactly What

the FramersWere Trying to Avoid? 5 REGENT U. L. REv. 215, 234-35 (1995).
38. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). The owner of a plumbing and electrical installation business
denied an OSHA inspector access to private areas of his business without a warrant, Id.
at 310.
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inspections.39 The Court stated that the exception rarely applied, and
that the fact that a business engaged in interstate commerce, and thus
fell under the OSHA statute, did not render it closely regulated.40 The
Court reiterated the Camarastandard for probable cause, which requires
that the agency show that it chose the business to be searched based on
standards in accordance with the statute,4 ' and determined that the
efficacy of the search would not be hampered by procuring a warrant
under such a relaxed definition.42
The Supreme Court then extended and altered the closely regulated
business exception in Donovan v. Dewey.43 In that case, the Court
determined that the federal interest in protecting health and safety
conditions in the mining industry, and the deleterious delaying effect of
a warrant requirement, justified a statutory system of warrantless
inspections." The Court distinguished Marshall because the statute
at issue there was not tailored closely enough and "devolve[d] almost
45
unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers."
Conversely, in Donovan, the statute satisfied the exception because it
was well-tailored and its detailed nature eliminated the exercise of raw
discretionary power by inspectors.4"
The Court rejected "closely
regulated business's" older definition of a long history of regulation in
favor of a classification based on the intensity of regulation, regardless
of duration. 7
In New York v. Burger,41 the Court announced a three-part test for
determining the validity of an administrative search statute in a closely
regulated industry. First, there must be a substantial governmental
interest "that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the
inspection is made."49 Second, the procurement of a warrant must
defeat the success of the inspection by, for example, taking too much

39. Id. at 324.
40. Id. at 313-14.
41. Id at 320-21. The Court suggested that probable cause could be based on a general
administrative plan that subjected businesses with a certain number of employees to

regular inspections. Id. at 321.
42. Id.
43. 452 U.S. 594 (1981). The president of a company owning a quarry refused to allow
the warrantless search of its mine. Id. at 597. The Secretary of Labor relied upon a
statute that authorized such searches, and the Court upheld the statute. Id. at 602.
44. Id. at 602-03.
45. Id, at 601.
46. Id. at 604-05.
47. Id. at 605-06.

48. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
49. Id. at 702.
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time or alerting the intended target.50 Finally, the statute's inspection
provisions must furnish a "constitutionally adequate substitute" for a
warrant.5 To satisfy this last element, the statute must advise the
owner of the possibility of searches and be sufficiently limited and
closely tailored.5"
Although the closely regulated business component of the exception
became more sophisticated, the Court did not abandon the simple
balancing of an authority's needs with an individual's right to privacy as
a means of allowing warrantless searches. This balancing alone justified
a warrantless search of a student's purse in New Jersey v. M.O."
Although the Court denied that children in school have a lesser privacy
interest, it observed that where the "balancing of governmental and
private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of
probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard."5 4 The
maintenance of a stable school environment required modifying the
Hence, to
suspicion level of criminal activity to justify the search.
determine if a search was reasonable, it need only be proved that the
search was justified in its inception and reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the original interference.56
O'Connor v. Ortega5" balanced the public employer's need to search
an employee's desk with the employee's right to privacy at work. The
Court determined that the employee's right to privacy, though wellfounded, was subject to infringement by a supervisor for work-related
reasons because the requirement of a warrant at that point would
"seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business.""
Likewise,
requiring probable cause would not be appropriate when the supervisor's
intrusion is work-related, or even when the intrusion results from a
work-related employee misconduct investigation, because of the
governmental interests of efficient and inexpensive operations.59

50. Id. at 702-03.
51. Id. at 703.
52. Id.
53. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). A high school student found smoking in the bathroom denied
the charge, but her principal, upon opening her purse, found cigarettes and marijuana.
The student argued for suppression of the marijuana on the basis of an unreasonable
search. Id. at 328-29.
54. Id. at 341.
55. Id. at 342-43.
56. Id. at 341.
57. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
58. Id. at 722.
59. Id. at 723-24.
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Instead, the Court relied on the reasonableness standard for a warrantless search and found that this less demanding standard had been met
because the employer's special needs exceeded the normal needs of law
enforcement.'
Before McCabe, Fourth Amendment challenges to involuntary
commitment focused on the seizure aspect of the Amendment. The61
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined in Villanova v. Abrams
that probable cause existed for detainment and did not entertain any
exceptions to the warrant requirement.62 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit
used the traditional probable cause standard with no discussion of a
lesser standard of proof.6" Thus, the law regarding violations of the
search component of the Fourth Amendment as applied to involuntary
confinements was neither settled nor even addressed at the time the
First Circuit decided McCabe.
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

Recognizing that McCabe was a case of first impression, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit began its discussion of the constitutional
claims by exploring two exceptions to the presumption that a search is
unreasonable in the absence of a warrant.64 Apart from the administrative search exception is the exigent circumstances exception, which
allows an agent to make a sudden decision that a search is necessary
when it is impractical for the police to delay.65 The court determined
that it did not need to find an exigent circumstances exception because
the facts fit the administrative search exception so well."
Following this determination, the court turned to the Burger threepart administrative search test. First, the court discussed the govern67
and
ment's interests: the legitimacy of the State's parens patriae
police power interests in assuring that dangerous people do not harm

60. Id. at 724-25.
61. 972 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1992).
62. Id. at 795.
63. Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1468 (10th Cir. 1996).
64. 77 F.3d 540, 545 (1st Cir. 1996).
65. Id. Plaintiff addressed only the exigent circumstances exception, and pointed to the
entire day delay from the time the commitment notice was issued until the following
afternoon when the constable arrived at the apartment as evidence of the lack of such
circumstances. She also contended that no exigent circumstanes would have allowed the
constable to arrange a meeting time with the police officers. Conversely, the City argued
that every commitment is exigent per se because a physician can only issue the order if
there is evidence that the subject is likely to seriously harm herself or others. Id. at 546.
66. Id. at 545.
67. This term characterizes the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons
under a legal disability, such as the insane. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
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themselves or others was beyond dispute." The court compared the
urgency and the compelling nature of the facts to the facts in Burger and
Ortega, and determined that because McCabe dealt with the potential of
death or bodily injury, it easily satisfied the state interest test.69 Next,

the court inquired whether the residential search procedures were
appropriately tailored to the above interests. 70 The court examined the
four categories of commitment procedures contained in the Massachusetts involuntary commitment statute.71 Mrs. Zinger's condition fit the
second provision, which allowed a physician, who had not seen the
patient, to sign an order if the situation suggested that the person would
create the likelihood of serious harm. 72 Noting that the Massachusetts
statute defined likelihood of serious harm as "evidence that others are
placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm
to them," the court determined the physician satisfied this element
through his evaluation of Mrs. Zinger's threats. 7' Furthermore, the
statute provided as precise a standard for human behavior as the court
thought could be expected.74 Finally, the statute was sufficiently welltailored because the police officer was permitted to enter the residence
for the sole purpose of executing the commitment order.75
Next, the court examined whether a warrant would defeat the
important purposes of the search.7' Although plaintiff pointed to the
full-day delay before the police acted, the *courtreplied that determining
whether a delay would harm the efficacy of the procedure is based on the
systemic attributes of the procedure itself.77 Thus, although the delay
may not have caused a negative effect in the instant case, a delay in the
process in such cases would, in the aggregate, significantly risk the
chance of a negative outcome because the commitment procedure dealt
with people who were potentially dangerous.78 More importantly, the
court posited, little additional protection would be offered by a magistrate executing a warrant in such a case because the physician, not the
magistrate, has expertise in this area.79

68.

77 F.3d at 547.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
77 F.3d at 547-48 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123
Id.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 549.
Id.
Id. at 550.

79. Id.

§ 12(a) (1996)).
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Finally, the court considered whether the procedure infringes on the
interests of the mentally ill." Echoing O'Connor, the court indicated
that the sometimes different standards of intrusiveness for searches in
the civil context were appropriate, compared to those for criminal
activity.8 1 Supporting this characterization was the fact that a physician, not law enforcement officials, made the decision to search.82 The
physician's relationship with the patient, unlike that of the parties
conducting a criminal search, is not adversarial, and the physician
performs an ostensibly neutral role akin to that performed by a
magistrate. 83 By contrast, the lower court had rejected the statute
because it found that no therapeutic relationship was disrupted by a
warrant procedure, because police officers and not orderlies or nurses
acted as the agents of the search. 4 However, the court of appeals
countered that many municipalities do not have the personnel to assign
nonpolice officers to such duties, and that the scope of the police officers'
search is so confined that it was irrelevant that police officers carried out
the commitment order.85 The court emphasized that it was approving
only the statute before it. 6
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The administrative search exception has been criticized for denying
87
citizens the very rights that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect.
Upon examining the history of the Fourth Amendment it becomes clear
that general warrants permitting searches of citizens without the
intervention of a magistrate were precisely what the Framers sought to
prevent." Cases such as Burger and Donovan involved statutes that
resembled in breadth a general warrant from the colonial period because
of the lack of individualized suspicion regarding the entity to be
searched.89 TL.O. and O'Connor, on the other hand, involved such

80. Id. at 551.
81. Id. at 552.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 553.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 554.
87. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978); Hemphill, supra note
37, at 218-31.
88. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 311; Hemphill, supra note 37, at 220-22.
89. Hemphill, supra note 37, at 256; Thomas K Clancy, The Role of Individualized
Suspicion in Assessing the ReasonablenessofSearches and Seizures, 25 U. MEMPHIS L. REV.
483, 485-86 (1995).
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individualized specificity, but relied only on special needs and did not
have the statutory substitute for a warrant.
Approving the search in McCabe required only a small step beyond the
principles set forth in cases mentioned above. Not only did the police
officers who conducted the search have a substitute for a warrant, but
that substitute was also highly individualized because of the burdens of
proof regarding Mrs. Zinger's behavior. As the court of appeals noted,
the physician functioned as a surrogate magistrate. Also, unlike Burger,
in which the defendant was convicted as a result of evidence found in
the search, the search in McCabe could not lead to criminal charges. Yet
in McCabe, the procedure could have been significantly improved had
the statute authorized the committing physician to dictate the escalation
of force and how the police should carry out the commitment procedure."° It is the physician, after all, who is aware of the nature of the
psychiatric condition suffered by the person to be committed. Furthermore, the physician in this case, as a result of the report by her children,
may have been aware that Mrs. Zinger was scared of the police and
could have thus mitigated the confrontation. Such intervention may
have prevented Mrs. Zinger's death.
Extensions of the administrative search exception are often viewed as
eroding Fourth Amendment rights." In the years since Burger and
Griffin, the Supreme Court has extended the exception to suspicionless
drug testing 2 and individualized AIDS testing.9' Because the test
used in determining the reasonableness of the search balances individual
rights against society's safety, one commentator argues that the formula
is skewed towards upholding the searches' reasonableness.'
Each
expansion seems to erode the protections the Fourth Amendment once
granted, and for this reason, any extension should be closely scrutinized.
ANNE L. TUNNESSEN

90. Although the Lynn Police Department had various rules about the escalation of
force, none of them took into account the known behaviors of the particular person being
committed-information that a physician could give through specific instructions. McCabe
v. City of Lynn, 875 F. Supp 53, 57, 58 (D. Mass. 1995).
91. See, e.g., Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale:Creatinga Chasm in Fourth
Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 90 (1992).
92. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
93. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
94. Nuger, supra note 91, at 131.

